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"MINIMUM CONTACTS": SHAFFER'S UNIFIED
JURISDICTIONAL TEST
JAMES FISCHER*
INTRODUCTION
Pennoyer is dead' however, its interment should hardly come
as a surprise. Commentators have long argued that quasi in rem
jurisdiction' was unconstitutional and had outlived its usefulness
The juridical/constitutional climate that once required Pennoyer's
*Member of the New York Bar.
1. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877). This epitaph was foreshadowed some
nineteen years ago, but with certain sober respect. See Ehrenzweig, Pennoyer Is
Dead-Long Live Pennoyer, 30 ROCKY MTN. L. REV. 285 (1958).
2. Jurisdiction quasi in rem has been given inconsistent definition.
Distinctions between actions in rem and those in personam are ancient
and originally expressed in procedural terms what seems really to have
been a distinction in the substantive law of property under a system quite
unlike our own .... American courts have sometimes classified certain ac-
tions as in rem because personal service of process was not required, and
at other times have held personal service of process not required because
the action was in rem....
Judicial proceedings to settle fiduciary accounts have been
sometimes termed in rem, or more indefinitely quasi in rem, or more
vaguely still, "in the nature of a proceeding in rem." It is not readily ap-
parent how the courts of New York did or would classify the present pro-
ceeding, which has some characteristics and is wanting in some features
of proceedings both in rem and in personam.
The RESTATEMENT OF JUDGEMENTS § 32, Comment a at 128-129 (1942) Mullane v. Central
Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 312 (1950) Compare the discussion of
"in personam, ""in rem," and "quasi in rem" jurisdiction in Hanson v. Denckla, 357
U.S. 235, 246-247 (1958), with RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS Ch. 3,
Topic 2 Introductory Note at 191-192 (1971), describe quasi in rem jurisdiction as in-
cluding both the plaintiffs assertion of a claim to or in specific property, such as in ac-
tions to quiet title or to foreclose a mortgage, and plaintiffs assertion of a personal
claim against the defendant which must be satisfied solely from property attached for
jurisdictional purposes. The Supreme Court in Shaffer adopted this binary definition of
quasi in rem jurisdiction, - U.S. at - , 97 S. Ct. at 2577-2578 n.17, drawing from
Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 246 n.12 (1958).
For purposes of this article, however, only the later of the two forms of quasi
in rem jurisdiction described above will be considered. See F. JAMES, JR.. CIVIL PRo-
CEDURE, at 630-633 (2d ed. 1965).
3. See, e.g.,von Mehren and Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Sug-
gested Analysis, 79 HARV. L. REv. 1121 (1966); Zammit, Quasi-In-Rem Jurisdiction: Out-
moded and Unconstitutional? 49 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 668 (1975); Comment, Long-Arm and
Quasi in Rem Jurisdiction and the Fundamental Test of Fairness, 69 MICH. L. REv. 300
(1970); Note, Quasi in Rem Jurisdiction and Due Process Requirements, 82 YALE L. J.
1023 (1973).
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holding has shifted.' Long-arm in personam jurisdiction, exercised
within the confines of fourteenth amendment due process limita-
tions, now provides plaintiffs with a forum more reasonably related
to a given controversy than the fortuitous location of the defen-
dant's property.' Gone are the days when one could recite with cer-
tainty that "[tihe foundation of jurisdiction is physical power.... -,
and we find ourselves in the enlightened age of "fair play" and
"substantial justice."
A landmark decision, recently announced by the Supreme
Court of the United States, broadly articulates the single standard
whereby jurisdictional determinations should be made. Shaffer v.
Heitner' specifically presented for review Delaware's statutory exer-
cise of jurisdiction quasi in rem over any record owner of shares of
capital stock in a Delaware corporation.' Mr. Justice Marshall,
writing for a divided court,' undercut the venerable cornerstone of
quasi in rem jurisdiction, Pennoyer v. Neff,"0 in its centennial year.
Marshall's majority opinion lays new groundwork for adoption of the
International Shoe Co. v. Washington" "minimum contacts" test as
4. See Zammit, Quasi-In-Rem Jursdiction: Outmoded and Unconstitutional?,
49 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 668, 670-671 (1975); Comment, Long-Arn and Quasi in Rem
Jurisdiction and the Fundamental Test of Fairness, 69 MICH. L. REV. 300, 305-306
(1970).
5. Judge Carodozo's comments on the situs of intangibles at note 27, infra,
are particularly illustrative of the contrived rationalization which developed with
respect to the situs of intangible personal property.
6. McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90, 91 (1917) (Holmes, J.).
7. - U.S. - , 97 S. Ct. 2569 (1977).
8. Delaware provides for "sequestration" of a non-resident's property located
in the state in order to compel the defendant's general appearance. DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
10, § 366. For jurisdictional purposes, Delaware has neatly denominated the situs of
shares of capital stock in corporations existing under the laws of Delaware, DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 8, § 169, and "sequestration" of such shares is frankly recognized by the
Delaware courts as a device to coerce a defendant's personal appearance. Hughes Tool
Co. v. Fawcett Publications, Inc., 290 A.2d. 693 (Del. Chan. 1972); Winitz v. Kliue, 288
A.2d 456 (Del. Chan. 1971); Wife v. Husband, 271 A.2d 51 (Del. Chan. 1970);
TransWorld Airlines v. Hughes Tool Co., 41 Del. Chan. 11, 187 A.2d 350 (1962); Sands
v. Lefcourt Realty Corp., 35 Del. Chan. 340, 117 A.2d 365 (1955); E.M. Fleischmann
Lumber Corp. v. Resources Corp. Int'l., 33 Del. Chan. 587, 98 A.2d 506 (1953); Weinress
v. Bland, 31 Del. Chan. 269, 71 A.2d 59 (1950). For an analysis of the constitutional in-
firmities in Delaware's use of these statutes for the purpose of obtaining personal
jurisdiction, see Folk and Meyer, Sequestration in Delaware: A Constitutional
Analysis, 73 COLUm. L. REv. 749 (1973).
9. J. Brennan was the sole dissenter. He could not accept the apparent ad-
visory opinion of the majority in its broad holding. - U.S. at - 97 S. Ct. at
2588-2593.
10. 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
11. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
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the uniform benchmark by which the constitutionality of the states'
exercise of jurisdictional powers will be measured."2
Although Shaffer's holding appears to extend boldly beyond its
facts,18 it is the author's position that Shaffer finally states the
ground rules by which our courts ought to recognize the invalidity
of jurisdiction quasi in rem. From the holding in Shaffer, a single
unified jurisdictional test should develop.
Both the historical bases of jurisdiction and the modern deci-
sional trends have been discussed extensively in legal literature."
12. The opinion in Shaffer recognized International Shoe' "minimum con-
tacts" test, 326 U.S. at 316, as the judicial refinement of Fourteenth Amendment Due Process.
13. See - U.S. at - , 97 S. Ct. at 2588 (J. Brennan, concurring and
dissenting). Mr. Justice Brennan attacks the majority opinion as unnecessarily expan-
sive of the facts: "fiun my view, a purer example of an advisory opinion is not to be
found." Id.
14. The most scholarly and broadly informative paper in this area is over fif-
teen years old. Developments in the Law-State Court Jurisdiction 73 HARv. L. REV.
909 (1960). See also Comment, Long-Arm and Quasi in Rem Jurisdicion and the Fun-
damental Test of Fairness, 69 MICH. L. REv. 300, 300-303 n.3 (1970), for a compilation of
recent publication regarding long-arm and quasi in rem jurisdiction indicating the ex-
haustive attention which has been afforded the subject of the jurisdiction of courts.
For commentary after 1970, see, e.g., Brown and Scott, In Personam Jurisdic-
tion Under Mississippi's Long-Arm Statute, 43 Miss. L. REV. 1 (1972); Carpenter, New
York's Expanding Empire in Tort Jurisdiction: Quo Vadis?, 22 HASTINGS L. J. 1173
(1971); Gentry, In Personam Jurisdiction-Due Process and Florida's Short "Long-
Arm': 23 U. OF FLA. L. REv. 336 (1971); Meyers, At the Intersection of Jurisdiction and
Choice of Law, 59 CAL. L. REV. 1514 (1971); Morley, Forum Non Conveniens: Restrain-
ing Long-Arm Jurisdiction, 68 Nw. U.L. REV. 24 (1973); Smit, The Enduring Utility of
In Rem Rules: A Lasting Legacy of Pennoyer v. Neff, 43 BROOKLYN L. REV. 600 (1977);
Trautman, Long-Arm and Quasi In Rem Jurisdiction In Washington, 51 WASH. L. REV.
1 (1975); Comment, Long-Arm Wrestling With Pennsylvania's Jurisdiction Over
Nonresident Individuals: The Reach of Section 8305, 21 VILL. L. REV. 410 (1975); Com-
ment, Quasi In Rem Jurisdiction Based on an Insurer's Duty to Defend- The Adoption
of the Seider Rule in Californio, 5 PAC. L.J. 115 (1974); Comment, Jurisdiction-Quasi
In Rem: Seider v. Roth to Turner v. Evers- Wrong Means to the Right End, 11 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 504 (1974); Comment, The Pennsylvania Long-Arm: An Analytical
Justification, 17 VILL. L. REV. 73 (1971); Comment, Judicially Refining the Missouri
Long-Arm Statute: A Tort as the "Minimum Contact'" 16 ST. LOUIS U.L.J. 315 (1971);
Comment, International Shoe and Long-Arm Jurisdiction-How About Pennsylvania?,
8 DuQ. L. REV. 319 (1970); Commentary, Conflict of Laws-Long-Arm Jurisdic-
tion-Mailing of Prescriptions into Forum State Does Not Confer In Personam
Jurisdiction over Doctor in Another State, 24 ALA. L. REV. 634 (1972); Note, In Per-
sonam Jurisdiction over Nonresident Buyers: Louisiana Lengthens its Long-Arm, 34
LA. L. REv. 691 (1974); Note, Territorial Fairness: A Due Process Standard for Quasi
In Rem Jurisdiction, 28 U. OF MIAMI L. REV. 439 (1974); Note, The Iowa "Long-Arm"
Statute-Ten Years Later, 23 DRAKE L. REV. 423 (1974); Note, Attachment of Liability
Insurance Policies: What Remains of the Seider Doctrine After Seven Years of Con-
flict, 34 OHIO ST. L.J. 818 (1973); Note, Conflicts of Law-In Personam Jurisdiction-A
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However, a brief overview of the pre-Shaffer jurisdictional
framework will be helpful. This overview will focus on quasi in rem
jurisdiction, the injustices which were perpetrated by strict
adherence to the "power" concept of jurisdiction, and the constitu-
tional and practical sufficiency of long-arm personal jurisdiction in
situations where quasi in rem jurisdiction had previously been need-
ed. In addition, the unified jurisdictional contacts approach of Shaf-
fer will be discussed in relation to its likely effect on in personam
and in rem jurisdiction. Most significantly, it will be shown that
Shaffer has effectively eliminated jurisdiction quasi in rem as a
necessary device. Finally, the Shaffer test will be applied to the case
of a plaintiffs attachment of defendant's interest in a liability in-
surance policy as espoused in New York's notorious Seider v. Roth"
decision. Absent defendant contact with the forum state other than
his insurer's qualification to do business, a plaintiff asserting quasi
in rem jurisdiction under Seider will quickly find that he has lost his
grasp on both the defendant and defendant's insurance carrier.
Before considering Shaffer's impact on Seider, it is appropriate to
discuss the juridical climate existing before the Shaffer decision.
THE TRADITIONAL JURISDICTIONAL FRAMEWORK
Prior to the Shaffer decision, jurisdiction was obtained by a
court with respect to a person, property, or a person's interest in
Futher Liberalization of the "Minimum Contacts" Requiremen 5 ST. MARY'S L.J. 373
(1973); Note, Long-Arm Wrestling in Pennsylvaniw" In Search of a Satisfying Answer
to In Personam Jurisdiction in Products Liability Cases, 33 U. OF PITT. L. REV. 839
(1972); Note. Civil Procedure-Long-Arm Statutes-Jurisdiction over Alien Manufac-
turers in Product Liability Actions, 18 WAYNE L. REV. 1585 (1972); Note, Louisiana
Civil Procedure-Jurisdiction In Personam over Nonresidents-Some Observations
on the Louisiana Long-Arm Statute, 45 TUL. L. REv. 1081 (1971); Note, Civil
Procedure-Long-Arm Statute-In Personam Jurisdiction Enlarged, 22 MERCER L.
REv. 451 (1971); Note, Jurisdiction-Long-Arm Statute-Participation in New York
Auction via Interstate Telephone Call by Non-domiciliary Held to Constitute "Tran-
saction of Business" Within Meaning of CPLR Section 302(a), 39 FORDHAM L. REV. 325
(1970); Recent Case, Civil Procedure-In Rem Jurisdiction Over Nonresident Defen-
dant Cannot be Obtained by Attaching Resident Insurer's Obligation to Defend and
Indemnify Defendant-Javorek v. Superior Court, 17 Cal 3d 629, 552 P.2d 728, 131
Cal Rptr. 768 (1976), 17 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 189 (1977); Recent Case, Civil Pro-
cedure-Service of Process- California Long-Arm Statutes Abrogate State's Immuni-
ty Doctrine, 27 VAND. L. REV. 357 (1974); Recent Decision, Jurisdiction-Forum Selec-
tion-Attachment Suit Based on Foreign Cause of Action by Nonresident Against
Foreign Corporation Sufficient to Confer Quasi In Rem Jurisdiction on Mississippi
Court, 45 Miss. L.J. 267 (1974); Recent Developments, Civil Procedure- The Extension
of Personal Jurisdiction Over Nonresident Corporations, 16 ST. LOUIS U.L. REv. 131
(1971).
15. Seider v. Roth, 17 N.Y.2d 111, 216 N.E.2d 312, 269 N.Y.S.2d 99 (1966).
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property." Jurisdiction of a state court was, indeed, a matter of
physical power." The state's physical power over an individual
within its borders gave general in personam jurisdiction whenever a
defendant was served with process within the state;"8 the state's
physical power over property within its borders provided jurisdic-
tion to adjudicate in rem with respect to that property or otherwise
affect the property qua property; and the state's physical power
over property within its borders developed into jurisdiction quasi in
rem to adjudicate the personal liabilities of property owners to the
extent of the value of any such property brought before the court."
Quasi in rem has been the least acceptable form of jurisdiction
in terms of procedural due process.' The judicial system's simplistic
physical power approach to jurisdiction did not often strain due pro-
cess in adjudicating in personam or in rem actions. Quasi in rem
jurisdiction, on the other hand, quickly advanced to constitutionally
16. See, e.g., McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90 (1917) regarding personal
jurisdiction; Arndt v. Griggs, 134 U.S. 316 (1890) as respects jurisdiction over a thing
(real property); and Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877) for an early discussion of
jurisdiction over a person's interest in a thing.
17. "As we have noted under Pennoyer state authority to adjudicate was bas-
ed on the jurisdiction's power over either persons or property. This fundamental con-
cept is embodied in the very vocabulary which we use to describe judgements." -
U.S. at - , 97 S. Ct. at 2579.
18. Jurisdiction in personam has even been sustained following service of pro-
cess in an airplane while present in the forum's airspace. Grace v. MacArthur, 170 F.
Supp. 442 (E.D. Ark. 1959). Long before Grace, a foreign defendant was personally
served with process in Boston harbor while on a mail steamer en route from Nova
Scotia to New York; the defendant's physical presence was determinative. Peabody v.
Hamilton, 106 Mass. 217 (1870).
19. Pennoyer expressed it this way:
[T]he State, through its tribunals, may subject property situated within
its limits owned by non-residents to the payment of the demand of its
own citizens against them; and the exercise of this jurisdiction in no
respect infringes upon the sovereignty of the State where the owners are
domiciled. Every State owes protection to its citizens.... It is in virtue
of the State's jurisdiction over the property of the non-resident situated
within its limits that its tribunals can inquire into that non-resident's
obligations to its own citizens, and the inquiry can be carried only to the
extent necessary to control the disposition of the property.
95 U.S. at 723. Although Pennoyer acknowledges existence of the United States Con-
stitution and the then-new fourteenth amendment due process clause, it is interesting
to note the reverent recognition paid in the foregoing language to states' sovereignty
and the due respect owed a sister state as opposed to the due process owed her
citizens.
20. See North Ga. Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601 (1975); Mit-
chell v. W. T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600 (1974); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972);
Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
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questionable extremes.' Jurisdiction quasi in rem was most likely
perpetuated, in the absence of an alternative procedure for bringing
foreign defendants before the local courts, as a necessary evil;' but
its initial usefulness has developed into a powerful tool of the
unscrupulous.'
The Use of Jurisdiction Quasi in Rem
Jurisdiction quasi in rem was once a necessary and helpful tool
available to plaintiffs whose defendants were either intentionally
elusive or otherwise absent from the state.u Exercise of jurisdiction
quasi in rem permitted a state to reach beyond its territorial
borders to provide redress for harm done to its citizens. The extra-
territorial effect of a state's exercise of quasi in rem jurisdiction
was not directly addressed by the courts because any property at-
tached for jurisdictional purposes was within the state and subject
to the state's physical power.
Pennoyer v. Neff developed the concept of quasi in rem
jurisdiction;" Pennoyer was the watchword of quasi in rem jurisdic-
21. See Harris v. Balk, 198 U.S. 215 (1905) and discussion at notes 34 through
36 infra and accompanying text. Beale, The Exercise of Jurisdiction in Rem to Compel
Payment of a Debt 27 HARv. L. REv. 107 (1913), strongly disapproved of the Harris
case quite soon after the Court's decision was announced, but the Court entrenched its
position. "The power of the State to proceed against the property of an absent defen-
dant is the same whether the obligation sought to be enforced is an admitted in-
debtedness [as in Harris] or a contested claim." Pennington v. Fourth National Bank,
243 U.S. 269, 271 (1917). See generally Louisville and N.R. Co. v. Deer, 200 U.S. 176
(1906).
22. "Every State owes protection to its citizens . Pennoyer v. Neff, 95
U.S. at 723. See also Zammit, Quasi-In-Rem Jurisdiction. Outmoded and Unconstitu-
tional?, 49 ST. JOHNS L. REv. 668, 670 (1975).
23. Whenever a foreign defendant who owns property within the forum state
is otherwise subject to personal jurisdiction within the forum, for example through
transactional contacts or frequent regular visits to a known place of employment, quasi
in rem attachment is generally still available and enables the plaintiff to win a tactical
advantage through its exercise. See Tucker v. Burton, 319 F. Supp. 567 (D.D.C. 1970)
(Wright, J., dissenting). Tucker is an outrageous example of such an election of
jurisdiction quasi in rem. Mrs. Tucker was a Maryland resident who worked in
Washington, D.C., and guaranteed a contract with a D.C. corporation. Household
Finance Corporation took an assignment of the corporation's rights and upon her
default proceeded quasi in rem against Mrs. Tucker in Washington, D.C. by garnishing
her wages. Even though personal jurisdiction over Mrs. Tucker was available, either
by service of process at her place of employment or by long arm service in Maryland,
quasi in rem garnishment was still permitted against the "foreign" defendant.
24. See note 4 supra.
25. Mitchell, an attorney, obtained a $300.00 judgment against Neff in an
Oregon action for attorneys fees. Service of process in Mitchell's action was merely by
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 12, No. 1 [1977], Art. 2
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tion for precisely one century, in spite of its logical fallacies and
historical frailty." The rule in Pennoyer occasionally proved difficult
to apply and led, for instance, to artificial treatment of intangible
property in order to determine the property's situs for the purpose
of pre-litigation jurisdictional attachment.' Nonetheless, Pennoyer
remained a necessary device at least until International Shoe was
decided in 1945.
Although the significance of International Shoe has taken
decades to develop, its rationale is the foundation for virtually all
progressive thought concerning jurisdiction." International Shoe
naturally derived its pervasive power from the simplicity of its con-
cepts of "minimum contacts" and "fair play and substantial justice."
When courts and legislatures recognized the practical usefulness of
International Shoe's "minimum contacts" approach to due process,
not only with respect to corporate presence but to personal jurisdic-
tion as well, Pennoyer's days were numbered." It appears that only
the vast inertia of our federal system, along with its conservative
adherence to stare decisis, has preserved Pennoyer's fate until its
centennial anniversary.
publication to the non-resident Neff who never appeared, and certain real property
which Neff owned was transferred to Pennoyer by sheriff's deed at a sale to satisfy
the judgment. The Supreme Court found that personal jurisdiction was never obtained
over Neff in the original action by Mitchell and held the Oregon court's judgment,
which resulted in the sale to Pennoyer, invalid. The Supreme Court went on to state
by way of example that Neff's property should have been seized by the court prior to
the first action thus making the suit in the nature of a proceeding in rem.
26. See Zammit, supra note 22.
27. Judge Cardozo described the flexibility assumed by the courts in locating
intangibles:
The situs of intangibles is in truth a legal fiction, but there are times
when justice or convenience requires that a legal situs be ascribed to
them. The locality selected is for some purposes, the domicile of the
creditor; for others, the domicile or place of business of the debtor, the
place, that is to say, where the obligation was created or meant to be
discharged; for others, any place where the debtor can be found. At the
root of the selection is generally a common sense appraisal of the re-
quirements of justice and convenience in particular conditions.
Severnoe Securities Corp. v. London & Lancashire Ins. Co., 255 N.Y. 120, 123-124, 174
N.E. 299, 300 (1931).
28. Even Professors von Mehren and Trautman in their comprehensive syn-
thesis of "general" and "specific" jurisdiction as a replacement for our presently less
precise jurisdictional forms draw heavily on the revolution in jurisdiction concepts
brought about by International Shoe. von Mehren and Trautman, Jurisdiction to Ad-
judicate: A Suggested Analysis, 79 HARV. L. REv. 1121 (1966).
29. See Shaffer v. Heitner, - U.S. - , 97 S. Ct. 2569, 2577 n.19.
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International Shoe makes possible the exercise of long-arm
jurisdiction in personam. With the rapid growth of the long-arm
statute came a lesser need for the state's reliance on jurisdiction
quasi in rem. Proper application of International Shoe's philosophy
comports with an overall extension of due process to a broader spec-
trum of situations, certainly, than earlier power concepts permit-
ted.' This extension is most desirable in light of the way in which
quasi in rem jurisdiction has been expanded to limits which ap-
parently ignore the existence of any constitutional restraints what-
soever; and which work to stifle consideration of due process during
quasi in rem jurisdictional determinations."
The Limits of Quasi in Rem Jurisdiction
The only constitutional requirement for obtaining quasi in rem
jurisdiction, until Shaffer, was the court's prior attachment of defen-
dant's property within the forum state.' Moreover, the defendant
30. Long-arm jurisdiction provides a local forum to many plaintiffs who would,
under earlier "power" considerations, have been forced into the defendant's state and
who would have often been deprived of their day in court by the cost of such an under-
taking. Before International Shoe, the plaintiff had to locate either the defendant or a
substantial amount of his property within the forum's territorial limits in order to br-
ing his suit at home; but now extra-territorial service is possible in a host of situations
which provide sufficient jurisdictional contacts. See notes 57 through 59 infra and ac-
companying text.
31. See, e.g., Ownby v. Morgan, 256 U.S. 94 (1921); Harris v. Balk, 198 U.S.
215 (1905); Seider v. Roth, 17 N.Y.2d 111, 216 N.E.2d 312, 269 N.Y.S.2d 99 (1966).
Oumby affirmed the Delaware sequestration procedure, ultimately rejected by Shaffer,
and did so with recognition that Delaware was "adhering logically to the ancient
distinction between a proceeding quasi in rem and an action in personam." 256 U.S. at
108. The Supreme Court went on to state that:
[Ownby's] appeal in effect was to the summary and equitable jurisdiction
of a court of law so to control its own process and proceedings as not to
produce a hardship. This is a recognized extraordinary jurisdiction of
common-law courts, distinguishable from their ordinary or formal jurisdic-
tion .... [W]here the proceedings have been regular, it is exercised as a
matter of grace or discretion not as of right .... A liberal exercise of this
summary and equitable jurisdiction, in the interest of substantial justice
and in relaxation of the rigors of strict legal practice, is to be commended;
but it cannot be said to be essential to due process of law, in the constitu-
tional sense.
256 U.S. at 110 (emphasis added).
32. Once the defendant's property was before the court by pre-litigation at-
tachment the state had power over the res sufficient to divest its owner whether he
actually knew of the proceedings or not.
Substituted services by publication, or in any other authorized form, may
be sufficient to inform parties of the object of proceedings taken where
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 12, No. 1 [1977], Art. 2
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was not additionally entitled to actual notice of the proceedings
since he was presumed to know all things directly affecting his pro-
perty." Service by publication after attachment merely added to the
proceeding an official gloss which had the substantive value of a
forensic wig. The exercise of jurisdiction quasi in rem has from time
to time fostered quite creative inequities. Three examples are wor-
thy of note.
Harris v. Balk" held that a simple debt obligation "clings to the
debtor and accompanies him wherever he goes."' This decision
made creditors generally insecure since the unsatisfied debt was
subject to attachment in any state where the debtor happened to
wander. The injustice of thus subjecting the creditor to quasi in rem
jurisdiction wherever his debtor is found certainly meets strong in-
tuitive opposition.' In Shaffer, we now find authority to challenge
Harris' meager measure of due process.
property is once brought under the control of the court by seizure or
some equivalent act. The law assumes that property is always in the
possession of its owner, in person or by agent; and it proceeds on the
theory that its seizure will inform him, not only that it is taken into the
custody of the court, but that he must look to any proceedings authorized
by law upon such seizure for its condemnation and sale.
Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 727 (1877).
33. Id.
34. 198 U.S. 215 (1905).
35. Id at 222. Harris owed Balk $180.00. Balk owed $400.00 to Epstein. Both
Harris and Balk were residents of North Carolina, but Epstein lived in Maryland.
When Harris visited Epstein in Baltimore he was personally served with a writ at-
taching his debt to Balk which he paid to Epstein without contest. Later, Balk sued
Harris on the $180.00 debt obligation and the North Carolina Supreme Court affirmed
Balk's judgment for the full amount, holding that Maryland had no jurisdiction to gar-
nish a debt owed by Harris during such a sojourn and that Balk's payment of $180.00
to Epstein, therefore, did not discharge Balk's obligation to Harris. Balk v. Harris, 130
N.C. 381, 41 S.E. 940 (1902). The United States Supreme Court reversed in logical form
with disastrous results. The Court held that the debt was located with Harris and that
"[plower over the person of the garnishee confers jurisdiction on the courts of the
state where the writ issues .... 198 U.S. at 222. Since the debt cannot itself be cap-
tured, it was effectively caught upon notice to the debtor, and so Harris' obligation to
Balk was effectively and properly taken by Epstein's Maryland proceeding.
36. "The rule of Harris, which in effect sanctions the mere presence of the
garnishee as a sufficient jurisdictional base, 'cannot be justified in terms of fairness.' "
Anderson, J. quoting Developments in the Law-State Court Jurisdiction, 73 HARV. L.
REv. 909, 960 (1960). Minichiello v. Rosenberg, 410 F.2d 106, 122, affd on reh. en banc,
410 F.2d 117, cert. denied, 396 U.S. 844 (1969) (dissenting opinion). See also note 120 infra
regarding the fact that the creditor and not his property is actually subjected to
jurisdiction.
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The Delaware "sequestration" procedure worked a hardship
upon persons holding stock in Delaware corporations." By statute,
Delaware was the situs of all shares of every corporation incor-
porated in Delaware." Under another statute, Delaware permitted
sequestration of any property owned by the defendant and situated
in Delaware as a basis for quasi in rem jurisdiction;" the defendant's
37. See Folk & Meyer, Sequestration in Delaware: A Constitutional Analysis,
73 COLum. L. REv. 749 (1973) for an incisive review of Delaware's sequestration pro-
cess.
38. Delaware's situs statute states:
For all purposes of title, action, attachment, garnishment and jurisdiction
of all courts held in this State, but not for the purpose of taxation, the
situs of the ownership of the capital stock of all corporations existing
under the laws of the State, whether organized under this chapter or
otherwise, shall be regarded as in this State.
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 169.
39. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 366 provides:
(a) If it appears in any complaint filed in the Court of Chancery that the
defendant or any one or more of the defendants is a nonresident of the
State, the Court may make an order directing such nonresident defendant
or defendants to appear by a day certain to be designated. Such order
shall be served on such nonresident defendant or defendants by mail or
otherwise, if practicable, and shall be published in such manner as the
Court directs, not less than once a week for 3 consecutive weeks. The
Court may compel the appearance of the defendant by the seizure of all
or any part of his property, which property may be sold under the order
of the Court to pay the demand of the plaintiff, if the defendant does not
appear, or otherwise defaults. Any defendant whose property shall have
been so seized and who shall have entered a general appearance in the
cause may, upon notice to the plaintiff, petition the Court for an order
releasing such property or any part thereof from the seizure. The Court
shall release such property unless the plaintiff shall satisfy the Court that
because of other circumstances there is a reasonable possibility that such
release may render it substantially less likely that plaintiff will obtain
satisfaction of any judgment secured. If such petition shall not be
granted, or if no such petition shall be filed, such property shall remain
subject to seizure and may be sold to satisfy any judgment entered in the
cause. The Court may at any time release such property or any part
thereof upon the giving of sufficient security.
(b) The Court may make all necessary rules respecting the form of pro-
cess, the manner of issuance and return thereof, the release of such pro-
perty from seizure and for the sale of the property so seized, and may re-
quire the plaintiff to give approved security to abide any order of the
Court respecting the property.
(c) Any transfer or assignment of the property so seized after the seizure
thereof shall be void and after the sale of the property is made and con-
firmed, the purchaser shall be entitled to and have all the right, title and
interest of the defendant in and to the property so seized and sold and
such sale and confirmation shall transfer to the purchaser all the right, ti-
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shares in Delaware corporations were an easy target. Sequestration
was frankly recognized by Delaware courts as a device to bring
defendants to the bench whether or not the litigation had any rela-
tion to the defendant shareholder's corporate or securities matters.'
Moreover, under the Delaware procedure, no limited appearance
was permitted.' Thus, the foreign defendant-shareholder was forced
to elect between an unlimited personal appearance and forfeiture of
any property attached. Even after an unlimited personal ap-
pearance, the defendant's property might remain security for a
potential judgement."
The final example of an inequity created by exercise of quasi in
rem jurisdiction is Seider v. Roth," where the New York Court of
Appeals permitted the plaintiffs to proceed by jurisdiction quasi in
rem through attachment of defendant's tenuous property interest in
his liability insurer's obligations to defend and indemnify him. The
Harris decision weighed heavily in the courts' later rationalization of
the Seider rule;" however, a most recent review of Seider frankly
admitted that stare decisis was the sole preventive of a prompt
reversal of the Seider case." Just ten days after the New York
tie and interest of the defendant in and to the property as fully as if the
defendant had transferred the same to the purchaser in accordance with
law.
40. The Shaffer Court noted that:
The primary purpose of 'sequestration' as authorized by 10 Del. C. § 366
is not to secure possession of property pending a trial between resident
debtors and creditors on the issue of who has the right to retain it. On
the contrary, as here employed, "sequestration" is a process used to com-
pel the personal appearance of a nonresident defendant to answer and de-
fend a suit brought against him in a court of equity. Sands v. Lefcourt
Realty Corp., Del. Supr., 35 Del. Ch. 340, 117 A.2d 365 (1955). It is ac-
complished by the appointment of a sequestrator by this Court to seize
and hold property of the nonresident located in this State subject to fur-
ther Court order. If the defendant enters a general appearance, the se-
questered property is routinely released, unless the plaintiff makes
special application to continue its seizure, in which event the plaintiff has
the burden of proof and persuasion.
Shaffer v. Heitner, - U.S. at - , 197 S. Ct. at 2574. See note 8 supra.
41. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 366 (a), requiring a general appearance by
the defendant before his property might be released either with or without security.
The court, however, was not bound to release his property.
42. See note 39 supra.
43. 17 N.Y. 2d 111, 216 N.E.2d 312, 269 N.Y.S.2d 99 (1966).
44. See Minichiello v. Rosenberg, 410 F.2d 106 (2d Cir. 1969); Simpson v.
Loehmann, 21 N.Y.2d 305, 234 N.E.2d 669, 287 N.Y.S.2d 633 (1967).
45. See Donawitz v. Danek, 42 N.Y.2d 138, 366 N.E.2d 253, 397 N.Y.S.2d 592
(1977).
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Court of Appeals reaffirmed Seider on its facts," the United States
Supreme Court effectively overruled Seider with its decision in
Shaffer.
Although quasi in rem jurisdiction led to egregious results in
certain cases, it was an understandable device, prior to the decision
in International Shoe, to bring foreign defendants before the local
courts. State courts were not anxious to usurp personal jurisdiction
without their borders only to face a sister state's refusal, under the
full faith and credit clause,'7 to enforce the judgment thus obtained.
This arguably unconstitutional exercise of jurisdiction was most
vulnerable to collateral attack." No state, however, could easily
challenge the sovereign's right and power to control property within
its borders, and so, states looked inward for what became the
slightest indicia of property which might be subject to attachment.
Now, with International Shoe and its progeny so firmly entrenched
in our present jurisdictional framework, it is difficult to imagine
how a court in a constitutionally contacted forum could find itself
helpless to issue process without the state in order to bring a
wrongdoer to justice."9
46. Id.
47. U.S. Const. art IV, § 1.
48. A frightening example of one state's refusal to give full faith and credit to
a sister state's judgment is found in Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287 (1942),
where the Supreme Court reversed North Carolina's bigamy convictions of petitioners,
who had obtained Nevada divorces and who then returned to North Carolina, remar-
ried, to live with new spouses. However, after remand to the North Carolina courts,
the issue of domieil as the jurisdictional basis of Nevada's divorce decrees was precise-
ly framed. Thus, upon the Supreme Court's review of North Carolina's new convic-
tions, the Court affirmed that state's disagreement with Nevada's jurisdictional deter-
minations and, with it, affirmed the defendants' prison terms. Williams v. North
Carolina, 325 U.S. 226 (1945).
49. The original "power" concept was unequivocal:
The authority of every tribunal is necessarily restricted by the territorial
limits of the State in which it is established. Any attempt to exercise
authority beyond those limits would be deemed in every other forum, as
has been said by this court, an illegitimate assumption of power, and be
resisted as mere abuse. D'Arcy v. Ketchum, 11 How., 165.
Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 720 (1877). An exception to the general rule that extra-
territorial service is void without attachment is found in the states' exercise of per-
sonal jurisdiction over nonresident automobile drivers who are involved in accidents
within the forum's territorial jurisdiction. Use of the fiction that a driver would be
deemed to appoint the state's registrar or Secretarty of State as agent for service of
process in suits arising out of operation of a motor vehicle within the state was upheld.
See Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927).
The painful result of overreaching the bounds of jurisdictional propriety, both in
terms of the litigation's ultimate outcome and in terms of the effort needed to reach
that outcome, is documented in Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
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Thus, Harris was an understandable outgrowth of Pennoyer
however, Seider has always been an extremely difficult decision
because it came so long after International Shoe.' Fortunately, long-
arm jurisdiction has now grown to the point where it will provide in
personam jurisdiction in all constitutionally permissible situations.5 1
The once-strong need for quasi in rem jurisdiction as a necessary
device to bring foreign defendants to justice has been abrogated.
Surely, the availability of a device so subject to misuse and overex-
tension as quasi in rem jurisdiction should be eliminated now that it
is no longer needed. Its redundancy should be recognized, and the
sufficiency of long-arm jurisdiction finally acclaimed.
The Sufficiency of Long-Arm Jurisdiction
Long-arm jurisdiction, as the decisional and legislative exten-
sion of International Shoe, typically provides a local forum in an ac-
tion against a foreign defendant where there exist certain
"minimum contacts."" Minimum contacts are required in order to
ensure that exercise of jurisdiction will not be arbitrary and
overbearing, but will compliment "traditional notions of fair play
and substantial justice"5R by guaranteeing the defendant due process
of law. Thus, long-arm jurisdiction is exercised according to a flexi-
ble standard," one which "cannot be simply mechanical or quan-
titative'"M and one which presently reaches all constitutionally per-
missible bounds."
Long-arm statutes express the states' new-found permissive-
ness in various ways.57 A number of states, however, see fit to avoid
50. But see Seidelson, Seider v. Roth, et seq.: The Urge Toward Reason and
the Irrational Ratio Decidend, 39 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 42 (1970). Seidelson's complaint
with Seider is that the New York court failed to assume full personal jurisdiction over
the defendants. See also Note, Attachment of Liability Insurance Policies: What Re-
mains of the Seider Doctrine After Seven Years of Conflict 34 OHIO ST. L.J. 818
(1973).
51. See notes 57 through 59 infra and accompanying text.
52. See generally Currie, The Growth of the Long Arm: Eight Years of Ex-
tended Jurisdiction in Illinois, 1963 U. ILL. L.F. 2577 (1963).
53. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. at 316 quoting Milliken v.
Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940).
54. McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
55. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. at 319.
56. Shaffer v. Heitner, - U.S. - , 97 S. Ct. 2569, 2584-5 (1977).
57. Two representative long-arm statutes are found in Illinois and New York:
(1) Any person, whether or not a citizen or resident of this State, who in
person or through an agent does any of the acts hereinafter enumerated,
thereby submits said person, and, if an individual, his personal represen-
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confining limitations of language and merely make statutory
statements such as "[jurisdiction over foreign corporations and
nonresident individuals shall be exercised] in every case not con-
trary to the provisions of the constitution or laws of the United
States"" or "on any basis not inconsistent with the Constitution of
this state or of the United States." 9 Because long-arm jurisdiction
has been so neatly extended to its constitutionally permissible
limits, the argument had been advanced, years before the Shaffer
decision, that quasi in rem jurisdiction was anacronistic and, at best,
qualified by the decisions in Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp." and
Fuentes v. Shevin."
tative, to the jurisdiction of the courts of this State as to any cause of ac-
tion arising from the doing of any of said acts:
(a) The transaction of any business within this State;
(b The commission of tortious act within this State;
(c) The ownership, use or possession of any real estate situated in this
state;
(d) Contracting to insure any person, property or risk located within this
state....
ILL. LAWS 1955, pp. 2238, 2245-6, ILL. REv.STAT.. ch. 110, § 17 (1963).
(a) Acts which are the basis of jurisdiction. As to be cause of action aris-
ing from any of the acts enumerated in this section, a court may exercise
personal jurisdiction over any nondomicilliary, or his executor or ad-
ministrator, who in person or through an agent:
1. transacts any business within the state; or
2. commits a tortious act within the state... ; or
3. commits a tortious act without the state causing injury to person or
property within the state .... if he
(i) regularly does or solicits business, or engages in any other persis-
tent course of conduct, or derives substantial revenue from goods
used or consumed or services rendered, in the state, or
(ii) expects or should reasonably expect the act to have consequences
in the state and derives substantial revenue from interstate or in
ternational commerce; or
4. owns, uses or possesses any real property situated within the state.
N.Y. CIV. PRAC. LAW § 302 (McKinney).
58. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-5-33 (1969).
59. CAL. CIV. PRAC. CODE § 410.10 (West) (1970).
60. 395 U.S. 337 (1969). In Sniadach, the Court held that Wisconsin's garnish-
ment of wages, with neither prior notice nor hearing, violated due process, although
"[s]uch summary procedure may well meet the requirements of due process in extraor-
dinary situations." 395 U.S. at 339.
61. 407 U.S. 67 (1972). Fuentes struck down Florida and Pennsylvania statutes
that permitted prejudgment replevin of consumer goods purchased under installment
sales contracts. Replevin was permitted upon ex parte application by creditors, but
recognized by the Court as a deprivation of property without due process of law.
Generally, the broad holdings of Sniadach and Fuentes state that seizure of property
will no longer be constitutionally tolerable without notice and an opportunity to be
heard except, perhaps, in narrow "exceptional circumstances" as found in the cases
cited by Sniadach, 395 U.S. at 337, and Fuentes, 407 U.S. at 91-92 nn. 23-28.
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One line of reasoning proceeds as follows:" since a seizure of
property necessary to obtain quasi in rem jurisdiction reaches no
farther than a fully extended long-arm statute, such seizure is un-
necessary to effect jurisdiction over nonresidents, and is possibly
violative of equal protection. The only remaining purpose in seizing
a nonresident's property is to obtain security for the plaintiffs pro-
spective judgment. Seizure of a nonresident's property, however,
should be subject to the same constitutional safeguards of notice
and a hearing,u as is seizure of a resident's property, and the
Sniadach and Fuentes strictures should govern.
The logic of the foregoing argument is inescapable in the light
of Shaffer. It can no longer be argued that quasi in rem jurisdiction
somehow provides a greater jurisdictional reach than the constitu-
tional "long arm." Both devices are now explicitly tied to those
jurisdictional propositions first laid out by International Shoe, the
result of which is to render quasi in rem jurisdiction finally and
totally unnecessary and improper. The list of injustices flowing from
exercise of jurisdiction quasi in rem is almost as long as the list of
commentators who decry its perpetuation. However, the Shaffer
Court has given the states the impetus and the tool to deal quasi in
rem jurisdiction a well-deserved death blow.
Shaffer's new unified jurisdictional test need not revoke the
validity of the bulk of prior law. Shaffer merely subjects each case
to a new analysis upon its facts. The beauty of Shaffer's rule is its
simplicity and its long overdue integration of all jurisdictional deter-
minations into a single resolution of International Shoe "contacts."
The elimination of quasi in rem jurisdiction as duplicative, and as
violative of due process of law, should be recognized as a corollary
of the Shaffer rule.
SHAFFER'S UNIFIED JURISDICTIONAL CONTACTS TEST
Shaffer v. Heitner" provides a single test by which courts are
to make jurisdictional determinations based upon the "minimum con-
tacts" considerations of International Shoe." "Minimum contacts" is
a simple, straightforward, workable rule that, although it will not
62. Comment, Quasi in Rem Jurisdiction and Due Process Requirements, 82
YALE L.J. 1004 (1973).
63. Fuentes and Shevin recognize only a narrow group of "extraordinary
situations" which justify a lowering of the safeguards imposed by those cases.
64. - U.S. - , 97 S. Ct. 2569 (1977).
65. Id. at 2584-5.
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greatly change jurisdiction~al determinations in personam" or in
rem,67 should curtail the exercise of quasi in rem jurisdiction and
arguably render quasi in rem jurisdiction unconstitutional.
The Court's Holding in Shaffer
Heitner brought a shareholder's derivative action in Delaware
against Greyhound Corporation, Greyhound Lines, Inc., and twenty-
eight present and former officers and directors of the corporation
seeking money damages." Greyhound Corporation was incorporated
in Delaware and had its principal place of business in Phoenix,
Arizona. 9 Heitner's action alleged that certain officers and directors
caused Greyhound Corporation and Greyhound Lines, a subsidiary
incorporated in California and having its principal place of business
in Phoenix, Arizona, to perform certain improper activities in
Oregon. The Oregon Federal District Court entered judgment for
$13,146,090.00 plus attorneys' fees"0 in a civil antitrust suit against
Greyhound Corp., and $600,000.00 in fines against both corporations
in a criminal contempt action."
In accordance with Delaware law, Heitner proceeded against
the individual defendants by moving for an order of sequestration of
Delaware property owned by those individuals."' Since the situs of
Delaware stock is Delaware by edict," Heitner sequestered the in-
dividual defendants' shares in the Delaware corporation- approx-
imately 82,000 shares of common stock-simply by placing "stop
transfer" orders on Greyhound's corporate books. Heitner and the
sequestrator were each required to post a $1,000.00 bond to assure
their compliance with the terms of the court ordered sequestration,'
but they otherwise provided no security for the financial impact of
66. International Shoe has already worked its magic in personam through
development of long-arm jurisdiction.
67. For jurisdiction purely in rem, the tangible res should prove an ir-
resistable contact.
68. Id. at 2572.
69. Id
70. Id at n.2.
71. Id. at 2573 n.3.
72. - U.S. at -, 97 S. Ct. at 2573.
73. See note 38 aupra. DEL. CODE tit. 8, § 1691 establishes Delaware as the
situs of shares of stock in Delaware corporations for the purpose of, inter ali, attach-
ment and jurisdiction.
74. - U.S. at - , 97 S. Ct. at 2573 n.5. Apparently, the amount of the re-
quired security is discretionary with the court and is in no way reflective of the value
of property attached.
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their $1.2 million attachment." The sequestered property was
Delaware's basis for assertion of jurisdiction quasi in rem over the
individual defendants; if the defendants ever wanted to see their
shares again, they were forced to enter an unlimited personal ap-
pearance in the suit."
After the Delaware courts upheld the sequestration procedure
in the face of constitutional attack, the United States Supreme
Court reversed, basing its decision on a broad application of the
"minimum contacts" standard of International Shoe. The Court ap-
plied this standard to "actions in rem as well as in personam." Pen-
noyer v. Neff' was rejected," and the ratio decidendi of those cases
which followed the power mentality of Pennoyer and McDonald v.
Mabee'" was seriously thrown in doubt. Mr. Justice Marshall made
the majority's point succinctly: "We therefore conclude that all
assertions of state court jurisdiction must be evaluated according to
the standards set forth in International Shoe and its progeny. 81 We
shall see that this test is most workable on a practical level.
The "Minimum Contacts" Test
As applied to future jurisdictional determinations under Shaf-
fer, the International Shoe test will not ignore the presence of pro-
perty within the forum state but will more properly weigh the
presence of defendant's property, along with all other significant
contacts which the forum has with the defendant and the litigation,
in determining the existence of jurisdiction.' The Court in Interna-
tional Shoe observed that,
75. - U.S. at - , 97 S. Ct. at 2574, n.7. Conceivably, by the Delaware
procedure, judgment could be entered by default, then assets liquidated and wasted,
with no recourse against the ultimately judgment-proof plaintiff who had fradulently or
otherwise improperly procured the original sequestration.
76. The Delaware Chancery Court unabashedly outlined the need for a
general appearance in its letter opinion in Shaffer, - U.S. at - , 97 S. Ct. at 2574.
Apparently, the Court of Chancery was of the opinion that the due process guarantees
expressed in Sniadach and Fuentes were inapplicable to violations of constitutional
rights which were limited in purpose and time.
77. "We think that the time is ripe to consider whether the standard of
fairness and substantial justice set forth in International Shoe should be held to
govern actions in rem as well as in personam." - U.S. at - , 97 S. Ct. at 2581.
78. 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
79. "It is clear, therefore, that the law of state court jurisdiction no longer
stands securely on the foundation established in Pennoyer." - U.S. at - , 97 S.
Ct. at 2581.
80. See note 6 supra.
81. _ U.S. at - , 97 S. Ct. at 2584-5.
82. "This argument, [for applying International Shoe minimum contacts to all
jurisdictional determinations] of course, does not ignore the fact that the presence of
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[hjistorically the jurisdiction of courts to render judge-
ment in personam is grounded on their de facto power
over the defendant's person. Hence his presence within
the territorial jurisdiction of a court was prerequisite to
its rendition of a judgment personally binding him. But
now that the capias ad respondendum has given way to
personal service of summons or other form of notice, due
process requires only that in order to subject a defendant
to a judgement in personam, if he be not present within
the territory of the forum, he have certain minimum con-
tacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit does
not offend "traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice."
[the due process clause] does not contemplate that a state
may make binding a judgement in personam against an in-
dividual or corporate defendant with which the state has
no contacts, ties, or relation.'
Shaffer's interpretation of International Shoe will not permit the
mere presence of property to be jurisdictionally determinative of
quasi in rem.
The Shaffer Court alluded to the reasons property might be
found within the state's borders and the relationship which those
reasons might have to the weight given the situs contact." If in re-
taining property within the state the defendants had "purposefully
avail[ed themselves] of the privilege of conducting activities within
the forum State,"" the situs contact ought to be enhanced
significantly and even become jurisdictionally determinative." If, on
the other hand, the property's situs were fortuitous or transient,7
property in a State may bear on the existence of jurisdiction by providing contacts
among the forum State, the defendant and the litigation." __ U.S. at __, 79 S. Ct.
at 2582.
83. 326 U.S. at 316.
84. "[W]hen claims to the property itself are the source of the underlying con-
troversy between the plaintiff and the defendant, it would be unusual for the State
where the property is located not to have jurisdiction." __ U.S. at __,97 S. Ct. at
2582. See note 109 infra and accompanying text.
85. Hansen v. Denkla, 357 U.S. at 253.
86. See note 80 supra.
87. See Seider v. Roth, 17 N.Y.2d 111, 216 N.E.2d 312, 269 N.Y.S.2d 99 (1966);
see also, Harris v. Balk, 198 U.S. 215 (1905) and notes 98 through 101 infra and accom-
panying text.
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situs must be buttressed with other, presumably personal, con-
tacts."
In this regard the particular outcome of Shaffer is somewhat
confusing. The individual directors and officers of Greyhound Cor-
poration had every reason to expect the assertion of Delaware's
quasi in rem procedure against them in the event of a shareholder's
derivative suit." These officers and directors were presumably
knowledgable in corporate matters and such an exercise of jurisdic-
tion was long established under Delaware law and was one of the
express purposes of the legislation which denominated Delaware
situs to Delaware shares." Mr. Justice Brennan's reaction to the
Court's apparently advisory opinion must find some sympathy,"-the
Court clearly reached far beyond the case or controversy presented
in order to state its new jurisdictional policy.
An understanding of the simplicity of the Court's ruling in
Shaffer makes immediately apparent the ease with which its new
test can be integrated with the existing framework of decisions
flowing from International Shoe." International Shoe requires cer-
tain "minimum contacts" between the defendant, the forum and the
litigation's subject matter. In this regard, Shaffer now explains that
the existence of property within the forum will no, longer be
88. The Court noted that:
[A]lthough the presence of the defendant's property in a State might sug-
gest the existence of other ties among the defendant, the State, and the
litigation, the presence of the property alone would not support the
State's jurisdiction. If those other ties did not exist, cases over which the
State is now thought to have jurisdiction could not be brought in that
forum.
- U.S. at - 97 S. Ct. at 2582-2583.
89. The majority apparently failed to consider all defendant contacts.
Certainly nothing said by the Court persuades me that it would be unfair
to subject appellants to suit in Delaware. The fact that the record does
not reveal whether they "set foot" or committed "act related to [the]
cause of action" in Delaware . . . is not decisive, for jurisdiction can be
based strictly on out-of-state acts having foreseeable effects in the forum
state.
- U.S. at - 97 S. Ct. at 2591 (Brennan, J., concurring and dissenting).
90. See note 40 supra.
91. See note 13 supra.
92. The variety of rules, standards and procedures previously applied in-
dividually to in personam, in rem and quasi in rem jurisdiction are now merged by
Seider's unified jurisdictional test thereby simplifying jurisdictional determinations in
terms of the variety of applicable law. "Minimum contacts" is certainly an imprecise
standard, however, it has been somewhat refined through thirty-two years of judicial
scrutiny since the decision in International Shoe.
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dispositive of the jurisdictional issue," not even for jurisdiction
limited to the value of an attached res." Rather, the presence of pro-
perty will be but one contact, occasionally significant 5 and occa-
sionally not,' which must be considered along with all other con-
tacts in regard to jurisdiction. The effect of Shaffer's test can be
analyzed in terms of the continued vitality of certain well-known
decisions which extend quasi in rem jurisdiction to, and ultimately
beyond, what are now known to be its constitutional limits. Our
three prior examples9 serve this purpose well.
The quasi in rem attachment which gave jurisdiction in Harris
v. Balk" was apparently the only contact which the defendant had
with the forum state." The presence of Mitchell in Maryland was ap-
parently fortuitous in terms of the debt situs and, from the Supreme
Court's sparse account of the facts, there was no other relationship
between the transaction, the litigants, and the forum. Mitchell could
as properly have been sued in Tobago;'0 constitutional contact was
equally lacking in Maryland. Although the Shaffer Court declined to
expressly overrule Harris,' its continued vitality cannot seriously
be argued.
Obviously, the Delaware sequestration procedure specifically
challenged in Shaffer can no longer stand without serious
93. See note 88 supra..
94. "The value of the property seized does serve to limit the extent of possi-
ble liability, but that limitation does not provide support for the assertion of jurisdic-
tion." - U.S. at __ , 97 S. Ct. at 2583 n.32.
95. See note 84 supra.
96. See note 88 supra and notes 127 through 142 infra and the accompanying
text.
97. See notes 34 through 45 infra and accompanying text.
98. 198 U.S. 215 (1905).
99. Although further contacts could very well have existed, the Court gave
them no express consideration. See note 101 infr.
100. "Can the island of Tobago pass a law to bind the rights, of the whole
world?" Buchanan v. Rucker, 9 East 192 (King's Bench, 1808). Tobago entered judg-
ment after jurisdiction was obtained by posting process on the courthouse door. The
defendant had never been on Tobago, and the Court at King's Bench refused to en-
force Tobago's default judgment. It is possible, however, that by modern tests, the
defendant was sufficiently commercially contacted to support jurisdiction.
101. The Court left little doubt of its intention:
For the type of quasi in rem action typified by Harris v. Balk and the
present case, however, accepting the proposed analysis [in terms of Inter-
national Shoe "minimum contacts"] would result in a significant change.
These are cases where the property which now serves as the basis for
state court jurisdiction is completely unrelated to the plaintiff's cause of
action.
- U.S. at - , 97 S. Ct. at 2582.
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refinement."' Those cases previously sustaining quasi in rem
jurisdiction merely upon the basis of such an attachment must fall
with the statute.'8 The Shaffer holding suggests that Delaware se-
questration might be permissible if the procedure is limited to situa-
tions involving the misconduct of corporate officers and directors.10'
Unfortunately, this suggestion fails to come to grips with the issue
of jurisdictional attachment or sequestration as a valid tool.
Finally, the effect which Shaffer will have upon Seider v.
Roth"5 is treated below as an example of the good result which Shaf-
fer can achieve at the frontier of quasi in rem jurisdictional ra-
tionalization. Before a discussion of Seider, however, it is ap-
propriate to note the ease with which Shaffer may be applied.
The Practical Application of Shaffer
Shaffer lends itself immediately to accurate judicial interpreta-
tion because it applies a jurisdictional concept which has been
developed and refined for years and which the courts have dealt
with repeatedly. "Minimum contacts" and "fair play and substantial
justice" are familiar phrases in the trial courts after years of conten-
tion with International Shoe.'" The only hurdle which must be over-
come in applying Shaffer's mandate will be the tendency of courts,
in light of the earlier quasi in rem mentality, to attach too great a
significance upon the presence of defendant's property within the
state. A danger exists that the defendant's attached property might,
102. Appellants, who were not required to acquire interests in
Greyhound in order to hold their position, did not by acquiring those in-
terests surrender their right to be brought to judgment only in States
with which they had "minimum contacts." . . . Delaware's assertion of
jurisdiction over appellants in this case is inconsistent with that constitu-
tional limitation on state power.
__ U.S. at __ , 97 S. Ct. at 2586-2587.
103. See, e.g., Ownbey v. Morgan, 256 U.S. 94 (1921).
104. "Delaware, unlike some States, has not enacted a statute that treats ac-
ceptance of a directorship as consent to jurisdiction in the State." __ U.S. at -
97 S. Ct. at 2586.
105. 17 N.Y.2d 111, 216 N.E.2d 312, 269 N.Y.S.2d 99 (1966).
106. See, e.g., Rosen v. Solomon, 374 F. Supp. 915, 919 (E.D. Pa. 1974); Ed-
wards v. Assoc. Press, 371 F. Supp. 333, 337 (N.D. Miss. 1974); Odom v. Thomas, 338 F.
Supp. 877, 878 (S.D. Texas 1971); Abrams v. U.S., 333 F. Supp. 1134, 1145 (S.D. W. Va.
1971); Casano v. WDSU-TV, Inc., 313 F. Supp. 1130, 1144 (S.D. Miss. 1970); AMCO
Transworld, Inc. v. M/V Bambi, 257 F. Supp. 215, 218 (S.D. Texas 1966); Rodrique v.
Yale & Towne, Inc., 251 F. Supp. 73, 76 (D.S.C. 1966); Waukesha Bldg. Corp. v.
Jameson, 246 F. Supp. 183, 188 (W.D. Ark. 1965); Ewing v. Lockheed Acft. Corp., 202
F. Supp. 216, 217 (D.C. Minn. 1962).
1977]
Fisher: "Minimum Contacts": Shaffer's Unified Jurisdictional Test
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1977
46 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 12
more often than may be justified, become the clearly decisive con-
sideration upon which the court will hang its jurisdictional hat.1"
The conceptions of in rem, in personam and quasi in rem may linger
as the courts find it impossible to speak without reliance upon these
familiar terms.1" Gradually, the courts should find that an intelligent
use of Shaffer's doctrine leads to results not unlike those achieved
in the past, but those results should achieve new validity in the
light of International Shoe's "contacts" test.
In rem jurisdiction should remain virtually unchanged. The
Shaffer Court clearly states that the contacts which the property
has with an in rem litigation should alone be sufficient to meet the
demands of International Shoe since the location of such litigation's
subject matter is seldom incidental.'"
In personam jurisdiction should continue to be subject to the
International Shoe standards. The Shaffer holding apparently does
nothing to alter the effect which a range of possible contacts will
have upon state courts' personal jurisdictional determinations.110
107. This is the problem, which courts often have, of fitting strained reasoning
to the apparently predetermined result in a given case. In this regard, the second
Williams result is most interesting. See Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226
(1945); see note 48 supra.
108. Similarly, in states where law and equity are said to have "merged," the
old forms remain and return repeatedly to make their continuing presence felt.
109. The Court recognized that:
[Wihen claims to the property itself are the source of the underlying con-
troversy between the plaintiff and the defendant, it would be unusual for
the State where the property is located not to have jurisdiction. In such
cases, the defendant's claim to property located in the State would nor-
mally indicate that he expected to benefit from the State's protection of
his interest. The state's strong interest in assuring the marketability of
property within its borders and in providing a procedure for peaceful
resolution of disputes about the possession of that property would also
support jurisdiction, as would the likelihood that important records and
witnesses will be found in the state. The presence of property may also
favor jurisdiction in cases such as suits for injury suffered on the land of
an absentee owner, where the defendant's ownership of the property is
conceded but the cause of action is otherwise related to rights and duties
growing out of that ownership.
__ U.S. at __ , 97 S. Ct. at 2582.
110. A liberal reading of Shaffer would suggest that in personam jurisdiction
has possibly been expanded by providing an additional unrelated property situs con-
tact for the court's consideration of a defendant's amenability to suit in the forum.
Such a tack would, however, be a departure from traditional long-arm "contacts" deter-
minations that, for the limited determination of jurisdiction in regard of a single tran-
saction or occurence, have concerned themselves not with the defendant's total con-
tacts with the forum, but rather queried the contacts which the defendant's litigation-
related activities had with the forum.
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Quasi in rem jurisdiction, however, has been shaken to its very
roots. Shaffer's application of International Shoe no longer permits a
state to seize upon the defendant's property as a sole jurisdictional
contact;1 and this result takes into consideration the fact that quasi
in rem jurisdiction, so obtained, applies only to the extent of the
asset attached."' What does this leave of quasi in rem jurisdiction?
Not a great deal. The argument advanced periodically over the
years that quasi in rem jurisdiction is outmoded and unconstitu-
tional"" has never been stronger, and the Shaffer Court appears to
have acceded to the reasonable demands of those seeking a rejection
of the quasi in rem jurisdictional basis.
In expressing its rejection of quasi in rem jurisdiction, the
Supreme Court recognized that years of contrary decision should
not be lightly disregarded. Thus, the statement that "[t]his history
[of supporting jurisdiction based solely on the presence or property
in a State] must be considered as supporting the proposition that
jurisdiction based solely on the presence of property satisfies the
demand of due process, but it is not decisive,' merely recognizes
an argument which the Court rejects. The Court refused to
"[perpetuate] ancient forms that are no longer justified,""' recogniz-
ing that the only significance which assertion of jurisdiction over
,property has is the effect upon its owner."'
111. The majority opinion noted that:
For the type of quasi in rern action typified by Harris v. Balk and the
present case, however, accepting the proposed analysis would result in a
significant change. These are cases where the property, which now serves
as the basis for state court jurisdiction is completely unrelated to the
plaintiffs cause of action. Thus, although the presence of the defendant's
property in a State might suggest the existence of other ties among the
defendant, the State, and the litigation, the presence of the property
alone would not support the State's jurisdiction.
- U.S. at - , 97 S. Ct. at 2582-3.
112. See note 94 supra.
113. See Zammit, Quasi-In-Rem Jurisdiction" Outmoded and Unconstitutional?,
49 ST. JOHNS'S L. REv. 668 (1975); see note 3 supra.
114. - U.S. at ,97 S. Ct. at 2584.
115. Id.
116. The Court stated:
[T]he fiction that an assertion of jurisdiction over property is anything
but an assertion of jurisdiction over the owner of the property supports
an ancient form without substantial modern justification. Its continued ac-
ceptance would serve only to allow state court jurisdiction that is fun-
damentally unfair to the defendant.
We therefore conclude that all assertions of state court jurisdiction
must be evaluated according to the standards set forth in International
Shoe and its progeny.
- U.S. at -, 97 S. Ct. at 2584-5.
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The Supreme Court's language could be used to support con-
tinued application of quasi in rem jurisdiction but with attempted
procedural safeguards intended to enforce the spirit of International
Shoe; however, jurisdiction quasi in rem is inherently unfair and is
often used to obtain a tactical advantage where otherwise un-
necessary in a practical sense.117 In light of Shaffer, the mere
presence of the defendant's property within the forum state should
be insufficient contact to justify that state's exercise of jurisdiction
under the Shaffer test, particularly since jurisdiction should be
otherwise obtainable in personam under International Shoe long-arm
procedures. The most telling statement of the Shaffer Court in this
regard is found at the conclusion of the majority opinion: "Ap-
pellants, who were not required to acquire interests in Greyhound in
order to hold their positions, did not by acquiring those interests
surrender their right to be brought to judgment only in States with
which they had had 'minimum contacts'."'1. The situs of property
within the forum may be considered by the court, but situs will not
be controlling. Shaffer now provides that the same "contacts" test
applies toward obtaining long-arm in personam jurisdiction as
toward obtaining quasi in rem jurisdiction. A sufficiently drafted
long-arm statute precludes the practical jurisdictional necessity of
pre-litigation attachment.
This being the case, legal authorities can only question the pur-
pose of permitting such pre-litigation attachment under any cir-
cumstances. Surely it should not be permitted in order that local
plaintiffs might have the option of harassing foreign defendants
when the opportunity presents itself. That would be a meager offer-
ing of equal protection. If the purpose for such attachment were to
secure the plaintiffs prospective judgment, Sniadach and Fuentes
guidelines state the requisite procedural safeguards. Such attach-
ment, however, is not, inter se, jurisdictional. In fact, the Shaffer
Court suggested that, perhaps, "a State in which property is located
should have jurisdiction to attach that property, by use of proper
procedures, as security for a judgment being sought in a forum
where the litigation can be maintained consistently with Interna-
tional Shoe."1 19 The suggested feasibility of such foreign state at-
tachment makes a procedure immediately apparent by which one of
the most troublesome outgrowths of quasi in rem jurisdiction can be
tamed. If, in a given case, long-arm jurisdiction was fully available to
117. See note 23 supra.
118. - U.S. at -_97 S. Ct. at 2586.
119. Id at 2583.
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bring defendants before the court, and if extra-territorial attach-
ment through the cooperation"s of foreign state courts and their pro-
cess could be availed in those instances where security were re-
quired, then there would be no excuse for allowing pre-litigation
jurisdictional attachment. The practice of using such permissive pro-
cedure to harass defendants could be stopped short. Unfortunately,
it may prove difficult for the states to relinquish the procedural
"rights" of their citizens, and it may be necessary for any further
limitations upon the exercise of quasi in rem jurisdiction to come
from the Supreme Court.'
In applying Shaffer, our state courts should take the initiative
to eliminate jurisdiction quasi in rem by using all due creativity and
by recognizing it as a vestige of our unenlightened past. They
should, for instance, encourage the liberal exercise of long-arm
jurisdiction within constitutional limitations but discourage un-
necessary attachment of property. This approach can be promptly
implemented simply through refusal to grant ex parte orders of at-
tachment or sequestration on which quasi in rem jurisdiction is bas-
ed.
Once the attachment procedure in permitted only upon notice
in an action, the irony of adherence to quasi in rem jurisdiction
becomes apparent. By Shaffer, the contacts required to give jurisdic-
tion quasi in rem and permit attachment/sequestration of the defen-
dant's property are the same as those required to permit full exer-
cise of in personam jurisdiction over the defendant. Thus, plaintiffs
election of limited quasi in rem jurisdiction in lieu of unlimited per-
sonal jurisdiction is incongruous.' 1 If the states insist upon permit-
ting their plaintiffs to proceed with attachment in order to secure a
potential judgment, even though they have obtained full personal
jurisdiction with the aid of the state's long arm, they may apparent-
ly still permit attachment to secure a potential judgment within the
guidelines of Fuentes and Sniadach. The end result, though, is a pro-
cedure which removes a bit of the sting from the sharp practice of
ruthless plaintiffs, but which allows the substance of our familiar
120. This procedure would work mechanically much like the present day open
commission or letters rogatory for invocation of the process of a sister state's court to
aid the taking of extraterritoral depositions.
121. See Sarchuck v. Rush, 97 S. Ct. 2964 (1977) which vacated the Minnesota
Supreme Court's approval of Seider v. Roth, 17 N.Y.2d 111, 216 N.E.2d 312, 269
N.Y.S.2d 99 (1966), and remanded for further action in light of Shaffer.
122. Of course, a great many quasi in rem attachments reach property of
substantially greater value than plaintiff's ad damnum and the "limited" jurisdiction
thus obtained is, for practical matters, unlimited.
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provisional remedies to remain for use by those who will genuinely
and honestly benefit from their availability.
The potential for reform which Shaffer portends runs generally
against the exercise of quasi in rem jurisdiction, and one final exam-
ple of the absurd extreme to which quasi in rem jurisdiction has
gone must be discussed. Seider v. Roth2 gave the residents of New
York State tremendous power over foreigners whose insurers do
business in New York. Shaffer now gives New York the opportunity
it recently requested' to retreat from the Seider doctrine. This doc-
trine, upon wise reflection by New York's highest court, is now
recognized as having been ill advised.
SEIDER V. ROTH: THE FINAL DAYS
A closing example of Shaffer's impact need not be
hypothetical.'" For years the decision in Seider v. Roth has been
derided by scholars and jurists both within New York and
without,'" and the list of serious Seider critics now includes the
very court which decided the case.2' When the Court concluded that
the liability insurer is the real party in interest who defends a
Seider litigation, New York's highest court ignored the realities of a
foreign defendant's inconvenience in being forced to travel to par-
ticipate in his defense and the haunting possibility that his ap-
pearance might be later held "unlimited." Even more serious, the
123. 17 N.Y.2d 111, 216 N.E.2d 312, 269 N.Y.S.2d 99 (1966).
124. See notes 127 and 135 infra and accompanying text.
125. New York has given us, in Seider v. Roth, 17 N.Y.2d 111, 216 N.E.2d 312,
269 N.Y.S.2d 99 (1966), a decision which a few years ago only the most perceptive seer
could have divined.
126. See notes 132 and 133 infra and accompanying text.
127. From its inception the Seider-Simpson rule, allowing the attachment of a
defendant's liability insurer's contractual obligation to defend and indemnify, has met
with criticism and rejection. See, e.g., Supplementary Practice Commentaries, McKin-
ney's Cons. Laws of N.Y., Book 7B, C.P.L.R. 5201 (Cumulative Annual Pocket Part
1976-1977); Minichiello v. Rosenberg. 410 F.2d 106 (2d Cir. 1968) (esp. writings collected
at p. 108), aff& on rek. en banc 410 F.2d 117 (1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 844, Javorek
v. Superior Court of Monterey County, 17 Cal. 3d 629, 131 Cal. Rptr. 768, 552 P.2d 728
(1976); DeRentiis v. Lewis, 106 R.I. 240, 258 A.2d 464 (1969); Ricker v. Lajoie, 314 F.
Supp. 401 (D.Vt. 1970).
We are not unmindful of the continued criticism of our holdings in Seider v.
Roth and Simpson v. Loehman. Donawitz v. Danek 42 N.Y.2d 138, 140, 366 N.E.2d 253,
255, 397 N.Y.S.2d 592, 594 (1977). But see Seidelson, Seider v. Roth, et seq: The Urge
Toward Reason and the Irrational Ratio Decidend 39 GEOWASH. L. REv. 42 (1970),
and Note, Attachment of Liability Insurance Policies: What Remains of the Seider
Doctrine After Seven Years of Conflict, 34 OHIO ST. L.J. 818 (1973).
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court ignored those basic tenets articulated by International Shoe
and reaffirmed in Shaffer.
Seider arose out of an automobile accident in Vermont between
residents of New York and Quebec. Defendant Lemiux was insured
with the Hartford Accident and Indemnity Company (Hartford) and
because Hartford was an insurer doing business in New York, the
New York Court of Appeals permitted Seider to attach Hartford's
obligation to defend and indemnify Lemiux as an intangible,
locatable res. Hartford's contractual duty was likened to a debt, and,
applying the reasoning in Harris v. Balk, the debt's situs was
located with the debtor.'" Conveniently, the Hartford Insurance
Company could be found just about anywhere.
The New York Court reaffirmed Seider's holding when it was
questioned in Simpson v. Loehmann.2" The Second Circuit specifical-
ly found that Seider did not violate due process, at least not in light
of the then-recent "miraculous per curiam opinion.""N The "miracle"
referred to by the Second Circuit denied reargument of Simpson on
the grounds that any recovery against the defendant was limited to
the fact value of the attached insurance policy, even though the
defendant should enter an appearance and defend on the merits."'
Other states were quick to reject Seider's boldness," and the reac-
tion to Seider from scholars and commentators was generally dishar-
monious."
128. Precise reliance upon the Harris debt situs did not occur until Simpson v.
Loehmann, 21 N.Y.2d 305, 234 N.E.2d 669, 287 N.Y.S.2d 633 (1967).
129. Id
130. Minichiello v. Rosenberg, 410 F.2d 106, 111 (2d Cir. 1969) quoting Pro-
fessor Siegel's Commentary on the C.P.L.R. & 5201, at 15 (McKinney Supp. 1968).
131. The "miracle" was given in New York's denial of reargument in Simpson
v. Loehmann, 21 N.Y.2d 990, 238 N.E.2d 319, 290 N.Y.S.2d 914 (1968).
132. See, e.g., Tessler v. State Farm Mutual Ins. Co., 458 F.2d 1299 (1st Cir.
1972) (applying Massachusetts law); Robinson v. O.F. Shearer & Sons, Inc., 429 F.2d 83
(3d Cir. 1970) (applying Federal Maritime and Pennsylvania law); Sykes v. Beal, 392 F.
Supp. 1089 (D. Conn. 1975) (applying Connecticut law); Ricker v. Lajoie, 314 F. Supp.
401 (D. Vt. 1970) (applying Vermont law); Kirchman v. Mikula, 258 So. 2d 701 (La. App.
1972); State ex rel. Gov't. Employees Ins. Co. v. Lasky, 454 S.W.2d 942 (Mo. App.
1970); Johnson v. Farmers Alliance Mutual Ins. Co., 299 P.2d 1387 (OkI. 1972); DeRen-
tis v. Lewis, 106 R.I. 240, 258 A.2d 464 (1969); Howard v. Allen, 254 S.C. 455, 176
S.E.2d 127 (1970); Honsley v. Anaconda Co., 19 Utah 2d 124, 427 P.2d 390 (1967).
133. See, e.g., Rosenberg, One Procedural Genie Too Many or Putting Seider
Back into its Bottle, 71 COLUM. L. REV. 660 (1971); Stein, Jurisdiction By Attachment of
Liability Insurance, 43 N.Y. U.L. REv. 1075 (1968); Comment, Attachment of "Obliga-
tions"-A New Chapter in Long-Arm Jurisdiction, 16 BUFFALO L. REV. 769 (1967);
Comment, Garnishment of Intangibles: Contingent Obligations and the Interstate Cor-
poration, 67 COLuM. L. REV. 550 (1967); Note, Minichiello v. Rosenberg: Garnishment of
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The Seider doctrine has been recently reviewed, by the New
York Court of Appeals in Donawitz v. Danek,M and affirmed with
regret. The Court of Appeals, however, limited Seider jurisdiction
to New York plaintiffs."H The Court also left the caveat that, given
sufficient authority such as that now found in Shaffer, it was inclin-
ed to dispose of the unpopular Seider experiment." Donawitz was
reported a mere ten days prior to Shaffer and, for want of fresh
authority, Seider's demise was delayed-most likely until its next
New York review.
Shortly after its decision in Shaffer, the United States
Supreme Court vacated a Minnesota Supreme Court judgment
which had permitted Seider jurisdiction, and remanded the case for
a determination in light of Shaffer.M7 Nonetheless, an early Federal
trial court review of Seider in view of Shaffer held that Seider is
still good law.'" The rambling verbiage of O'Connor v. Lee-Hy Pav-
ing Corp., grounded firmly in neither law nor logic, presents no per-
suasive obstacle to proper rejection of the Seider technique by any
court which must face it.'" A New York state trial court, however,
Intangibles-In Search of a Rationale, 64 Nw. U. L. REv. 407 (1969); Note, Quasi In
Rem Jurisdiction Based on Insurer's Obligations, 19 STAN. L. REv. 654 (1967); Note,
Seider v. Roth. Attachment of an Insurer's Obligation to Defend, 71 DicK. L. REv. 653
(1967); Note, Seider v. Roth. The Constitutional Phase, 43 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 58 (1968).
134. 42 N.Y.2d 138, 366 N.E.2d 253, 397 N.Y.S.2d 592 (1977).
135. The limitation is found in the court's refusal to permit a foreign plaintiff
to proceed by Seider.
Although stare decisis dictates that we refrain from unnecessarily
reaching out to overrule the precedents established by Seider and Simp-
son, it does not require that we expand the scope of the doctrine. While
the insurer's "duty to defend and indemnify" has been found to be an at-
tachable debt where the plaintiff is a resident, this special type of con-
tract duty, however it may be classified or denominated, is not of suffi-
cient substance to support quasi in rem jurisdiction where the plaintiff is
a nonresident.
397 N.Y.S.2d at 595.
136. See note 128 supra.
137. Savchuck v. Rush, - U.S. __ . 97 S. Ct. at 2964 (1977).
138. O'Connor v. Lee-Hy Paving Corp., 437 F. Supp. 994 (E.D.N.Y. 1977).
139. O'Connor reached its determination that Seider jurisdiction exists after
Shaffer even though
lilt [was] not argued, nor could it be, that [defendants had] even a
minimum of contacts with New York, the forum state, or that, if, instead
of contract rights against two insurers, tangible property transiently in
New York were the property attached, it would be easy to claim that
jurisdiction would exist in a New York court.
437 F. Supp. 994, 997. The Court simply reasoned that:
[aln analysis of jurisdictional property in the ultimate terms implied by
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has recently rejected Seider squarely on the holding in Shaffer, and,
in review, the United States District Court for the Eastern District
of New York concurred."
Seider quasi in rem attachment was permitted in New York in
order to broaden the jurisdictional reach of the forum. Long-arm
jurisdiction was unable to provide in personam jurisdiction over
foreign defendants who injured New Yorkers outside of the state
because, as apparently recognized by the legislature when drafting
New York's long-arm statute, the International Shoe contacts test
could not be met. There were simply insufficient contacts between
the defendant, the forum and the litigation to permit such an at-
tempted jurisdictional extension.
The New York Court of Appeals apparently noticed this defi-
ciency and so, in deciding Seider, the Court of Appeals judicially
created a "direct action" remedy."' Since direct action statutes are
constitutional,' New York's direct action decision should arguably
be no less proper. The necessary contacts are, however, obtained
with the insurer and not the insured."'
If the insurer could be named and sued directly in a forum with
minimum contacts there might be less difficulty with Shaffer.
However, under Shaffer the mere fortuitous presence of a defen-
dant's insurer in the plaintiffs home state should be recognized as
an isolated contact which cannot of itself support jurisdiction to ad-
judicate extraterritorial events.
CONCLUSION
Shaffer v. Heitner'" has finally brought all personal jurisdic-
tional determinations within a single comprehensive test. Those
Shaffer cannot ignore the claimants' circumstances and her interest in
litigating in the forum of her residence.
I&
140. See Katz v. Umansky, New York Law Journal, Monday, November 28,
1977, p. 13, col. 5. See also Torres v. Towmotor Division of Caterpillar, Inc., 77 Civ.
1810 (E.D.N.Y. November 18,1977).
141. See Simpson v. Loehman, 21 N.Y.2d 305, 287 N.Y.S.2d 633, 234 N.E.2d 669
(1967) (Burke, J., dissenting).
142. Watson v. Employers Liab. Assurance Corp., 348 U.S. 66 (1954).
143. One aspeci of Seider jurisdiction must save New York substantial embar-
rassment. Since the defendant's liability insurers are doing business in New York, en-
forcement of eventual judgments takes place where the defendant's assets, indeed the
only assets against which the judgment may be applied, can be found. It is fortunate
that New York has never been forced to contend with refusals of her sister states to
enforce a Seider judgment in accordance with full faith and credit.
144. - U.S. - , 97 S., Ct. at 2569 (1977).
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cases previously segregated as in personam, in rem or quasi in rem
will all be adjudged to be properly or improperly before a court by
application of the well-known International Shoe criteria of
"minimum contacts" and "fair play and substantial justice".
Of greatest significance, Shaffer gives the states an opportuni-
ty to eliminate exercise of quasi in rem jurisdiction. Such a result
would be the logical corollary to Shaffer's holding inasmuch as long-
arm in personam jurisdiction may now be exercised precisely in
those situations where International Shoe contacts would otherwise
provide an arguable basis for quasi in rem attachment.
Shaffer should mandate few changes to the states' exercise of
jurisdiction in areas other than quasi in rem jurisdiction, but quasi
in rem jurisdiction can now be recognized as but the shadow of what
it once was. At the very least, a defendant's fleeting contacts with
the forum state, such as were present in Harris v. Balk"5 and Seider
v. Roth'" should no longer control. Shaffer's measure of due process
has surely been long overdue.
145. 198 U.S. 215 (1905).
146. 17 N.Y.2d 111, 216 N.E.2d 312, 269 N.Y.S.2d 99 (1966).
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